Rabin encryption and a secure ownership transfer protocol based on the difficulty of factorization of a public key use a small public exponent. Such encryption requires random number padding. The Coppersmith's shortpad attack works effectively on short padding, thereby allowing an adversary to extract the secret message. However, the criteria for determining the appropriate padding size remains unclear. In this paper, we derived the processing-time formula for the shortpad attack and determined the optimal random-padding size in order to achieve the desired security.
Introduction
Modular exponential-type cryptosystems, such as RSA and Rabin, are widely used, typically with the encryption of message M represented as
where the concatenation operator is denoted by ||, M is a message, r is a random number for padding, and N = pq is a public composite of large, distinct, and balanced primes p and q. An N of 1,024 or 2,048 bits is often chosen in practice, and the Rabin cryptosystem uses δ = 2, whereas RSA uses every δ satisfying the condition gcd(δ, ϕ(N )) = 1, where ϕ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler's totient function. Doss et al. [8] proposed an efficient secure ownership -transfer protocol for radio frequency identification (RFID) tags using quadratic and biquadratic modular exponentiation(i.e., δ = 2 and 4), this similar protocol was also proposed by Zhou [30] . The RFID systems comprise of tags passively powered by the interrogator. The tags are low-cost wireless devices that associate a unique ID (UID) with the product. The RFID tag can be used to prove the authenticity of objects, with security reliant upon the premise that an RFID tag is harder to copy than a bar code. If an RFID tag is illegally replicated by an adversary, a counterfeit tag can be created to mimic the authentic one [12] . Modular exponentiation of large integers exerts a heavy computational burden; therefore, an early proposal advocated the use of public exponents as small as δ = 3 with RSA due to the significant benefits associated with computational efficiency. However, Coppersmith noted that such small public exponents are unsafe if the random padding, r, satisfies 0 ≤ r ≤ X, with X = N 1 δ 2 −ǫ for some ǫ > 0. Coppersmith showed that the secret message, M , could be reconstructed from two ciphertexts using a lattice reduction algorithm. in a technique referred to as the shortpad attack. Coppersmith described an efficient algorithm capable of identifying small roots of univariate or bivariate polynomials modulo a given integer, the factor of which is unknown. This algorithm uses the LenstraLenstra-Lovász(LLL) lattice basis reduction algorithm [16] to find a polynomial with smaller coefficients that has the same roots. As a result, δ = 65537 became widely used for RSA encryption. In fact, the open SSL/TLS uses this public exponent as a default [7] . RSA encryption with δ = 65537 is safe, because the insecure padding size devolves to zero, thereby rendering the shortpad attack an unrealistic threat.
On the other hand, the Rabin cryptosystem and the secure ownershiptransfer protocol using short random padding remain vulnerable, because these exponents δ = 2 and 4 must be fixed. Since the circuit size and power consumption of RFID tags are strongly limited, these cryptosystems tend to avoid many modular squaring. Therefore, the format of the random padding, including its size, is an important problem in such cryptosystems. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to determining an optimal padding size, and the computational cost of a shortpad attack has not been sufficiently studied.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a principle for determining the optimal size of random padding. Users of cryptosystems wish to store more information (e.g., longer UID and/or additional product information) in a given device. In addition, the generation of high-quality large random numbers for padding is a heavy burden for the device. Generally, an RFID tag has a term of validity predetermined by its service provider. Since factorization of N requires a huge amount of time, it is unlikely that prime factorization will succeed, but it is not the case for the shortpad attack. Therefore, the size of the padding should be determined so that it cannot be broken within the term of validity of a given tag.
In this paper, we present a faster algorithm than the original one, for the current fastest algorithm is required to measure the appropriate random-padding size. Moreover, in practical situations, an adversary can obtain an arbitrary number of distinct ciphertexts from a single RFID tag for the same message. Considering this situation, we solved the following two problems. The first involves minimizing the cost of lattice reduction in order to expand the randompadding size to allow an attack to succeed in realistic time. Specifically, we show a method to accelerate the Coppersmith's shortpad attack by using an improved lattice of which the dimension is approximately 1/δ that of the origi-nal. We showed that the time required to attack can be represented by a septic polynomial of lattice dimension; therefore, the computational time consumed by lattice reduction is proportional to the seventh power of the lattice dimension asymptotic. As a result, the time required for the shortpad attack decreased significantly.
The second employs many of the ciphertexts obtained in practical situations. Here, we note that at least two ciphertexts are required for the shortpad attack because it reconstructs the secret information from the gap between the two random numbers, each of which is embedded in the corresponding ciphertext. In case where many ciphertexts are available, an adversary can find a pair of ciphertexts with a small gap in a certain probability. The birthday paradox indicates that the more ciphertexts are available, the higher the probability is. We expand the insecure padding size of the shortpad attack by the birthday paradox.
This paper is the first research that systematically analyzes the appropriate size of random padding for Rabin and related cryptosystems.
Preliminaries

Rabin Cryptosystem
The Rabin cryptosystem [24] is a public key cryptosystem based on the factorization difficulty of N = pq where p and q are large and distinct balanced primes. N is the public key, and p and q are secret keys. To reduce decryption complexity, p and q are chosen to satisfy p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4). According to Dirichlet's theorem on arithmetic progressions (see e.g., Theorem 5.52 of Shoup's book [27] ), infinitely many prime numbers p that satisfy p ≡ 3 (mod 4) exist. In the Rabin cryptosystem, to encrypt a padded message (M || r) ∈ Z * N with a random number, r, of some suitable length, the sender computes its square mod N :
where Z * N = (Z/N Z) * is the reduced residue system mod N . To decrypt the ciphertext C, the receiver computes its square roots √ C of C mod N using p and q. First, compute
mod q using an efficient exponentiation algorithm. Second, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem(see e.g., Theorem 2.6 of Shoup's book [27] ), the four roots are computed as follows:
Finally, the receiver recognizes the valid plaintext based on its format, such as redundancy and structure.
Lattice Reduction and Coppersmith's Theorem
Definition 1. Let u 1 , . . . , u ω ∈ Z ℓ be linearly independent vectors with ω ≤ n. The lattice L = u 1 , . . . , u ω spanned by the vectors u i (1 ≤ i ≤ ω) is the set of all linear combinations of those vectors with integer coefficients. The volume
, where L is the matrix with rows comprising the basis vectors
The LLL algorithm [16] computes a short vector in a lattice in polynomial time:
where U is the largest Euclidean norm of u i (i = 1, 2, . . . , ω).
To improve the complexity of lattice reduction, we used a fast implementation of LLL called fpLLL [11] , which includes several floating point versions of LLL, such as L 2 algorithm [21] . L 2 is an improved version of floating-point LLL due to Nguyen and Stehlé [21] . We note that several implementations of LLL are known, and the most popular ones among them are NTL [28] and fpLLL [11] . Although NTL is more classical one than fpLLL and has been widely used, fpLLL has been gaining considerable reputation for its efficiency as remarked in Mariano [17] . fpLLL is much faster than NTL in some cases in which, e.g., a lattice basis with huge coefficients is used. In fact, fpLLL is much faster than NTL in our simulation where such ones are used, for the details, see Jingguo and Jiayang [15] . fpLLL includes L 2 algorithm, which is an improved version of floating-point LLL due to [21] . To the best of our knowledge, we can only experimentally estimate the complexity of fpLLL since fpLLL includes several variants of LLL, together with several heuristics as remarked in [15] . However, as we will see later, the experimental results show that the complexity of fpLLL for lattice bases we used is approximately consistent with the theoretical one of L 2 . This might be caused that we used lattice bases with huge coefficients and that evoked a consistent call of the L 2 algorithm. 
Proof. We have
Here we provide a sketch of proof of Theorem 4. We consider the lattice spanned by the coefficient vectors of polynomial f i,j (xX) for a given m ≥ 1, where
We call this type of lattice a conventional lattice, and denote it by L conv . Clearly,
These coefficient vectors form a lower triangular basis of a full rank lattice of dimension ω = dm + 1. For example, each blank and * denote zero and some component, respectively( Table  1 ). The determinant of the lattice is then the product of the diagonal elements, which gives vol(
According to Theorem 2, the LLL algorithm finds a short coefficient vector in the lattice L conv if the range of X satisfies
that is,
Sylvester matrix and Resultant
Definition 6. (Sylvester matrix and Resultant) Given the positive-degree polynomials f (x) and g(x) ∈ Z[x], we represent them in the form Table 1 :
where f r = 0 and g s = 0. The Sylvester matrix of f and g with respect to x is then denoted by Syl(f, g, x) and defined as
This is a square matrix with r + s rows and columns. The resultant Res(f, g, x) of f and g with respect to variable x is defined as the determinant of its Sylvester matrix. The resultant Res(f, g, x) is then equal to zero if and only if the two polynomials have a root in common. For bivariate polynomials f (x, y) and g(x, y), the resultant Res(f, g, y) of these two polynomials is computed by considering them as polynomials in y. In this case, their coefficients comprise particular polynomials in x.
Coppersmith's Shortpad Attack
Here we describe the principle of the shortpad attack, which requires two different ciphertexts for the same message M with different unknown paddings as follows:
Extracting message M from equation (2) can be reduced to finding common roots (x, y) of f 1 (x, y) = y δ − C 1 and f 2 (x, y) = (x + y) δ − C 2 by setting y = (M || r 1 ) and x = r 2 − r 1 . To do this, the adversary finds a small root x of the resultant Res(f 1 , f 2 , y) using Theorem 4. Using this x, y can be found by computing gcd(f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y)), followed by finding M in the upper bits of y = (M || r 1 ).
Format of random padding
Coppersmith [4] and Boneh-Durfee-Frankel [2] showed that a short padding located at the tail and head of a message invites a shortpad attack, respectively. To manage positioning of the random padding in a unified manner, we introduce the concept of a 'projective equivalent format. ' 
Projective Equivalent Format
Here, we introduce an equivalence relation between data formats, enabling the discussion of shortpad attacks against various data formats within the same framework.
* represents all binary strings of finite length.
Definition 8. Two formats F 1 and F 2 are projective equivalent if there exists a number a ∈ Z * N such that F 2 (x) = aF 1 (x) for every x ∈ {0, 1} * . We denote the relation that F 1 is projective equivalent to
Clearly, the binary relation ∼ is equivalent relation(i.e., ∼ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive).
For example, a data format
is projective equivalent to
, random padding appears to be divided into two parts, but is projective equivalent to F 1 . Generally, a format F 1 is projective equivalent to F 2 , which is left or right circular shifted by any bits of F 1 . If the shortpad attack works on a format F 1 , then the attack also works on F 2 that is projective equivalent to F 1 .
Shortpad Attack on Challenge-Response Authentication
The shortpad attack is possible regardless of the position of 'challenge', even if the challenge is divided into several parts. We first consider the case the following format (Smes 1 || challenge || Smes 2 || random padding),
where Smes i (i = 1, 2) are portions of a secret message, and two ciphertexts with a same secret message are as follows.
where c i (i = 1, 2) are challenges, and r j (j = 1, 2) are random paddings. Here if we set
where |r| represents the length of the random padding, and the two challenges, c 1 and c 2 , are known values. In this case, we can find roots of the resultant polynomial of the following form:
As noted in the previous section, the polynomial h(x) is monic. This case fits that presented by Coppersmith, and the challenge can be split into several portions. For example, consider the following format;
This shows two split challenges, challenge H and challenge L . In this case, we replace the above h(x) with g(∆(x)). Here,
where ∆ H and ∆ L are the differences between two challenges with respect to positions H and L. In the case where it is divided into three or more portions, the shortpad attack is similarly possible.
Reducing the Dimension of the Lattice
This section describes construction of a lower-dimensional lattice that leads to the same small root as a conventional one. We can reduce the dimension of the lattice to almost 1/δ that of the conventional. We consider a univariate polynomial of the form g(
and a positive integer δ. Hereafter, we denote all polynomials with integer coefficients of the form
Proof. We compute the resultant Res(y δ − C 1 , (x + y) δ − C 2 , y) directly. To describe the Sylvester matrix with respect to f 1 (x, y) = y δ − C 1 and f 2 (x, y) = (x + y) δ − C 2 , we define two matrices as follows:
where the symbol δ s denotes the binomial coefficient. Determinant det Syl(f 1 , f 2 , y) can be represented by the following.
Here we set C = C 2 − C 1 . This shows that the matrix size of Λ + C 1 Γ is δ × δ and deg Syl(f 1 , f 2 , y) = δ 2 . Let Z = Λ + C 1 Γ; therefore its (i, j)-entry z ij is given by
By definition, the determinant of Z is given by the following:
where S δ denotes the symmetric group of degree δ and sgn(σ) the sign of σ ∈ S δ . Let us show that
. To do this, let E(σ) = {i : i = σ(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ δ}, with the number of elements of E(σ) denoted by ℓ(σ), and τ (i) = 0 for i > σ(i), = 1 for i < σ(i). Using these notations, we have
where c(σ, δ) is a constant dependent only upon σ and δ. Additionally, we used
Theorem 10. Let N be a positive integer of unknown factorization, and g(x) be a univariate monic polynomial in Z[x δ ] of degree βδ. We can then find all roots x 0 for the equation
with |x 0 | N ≤ X in polynomial time. Here the bound X is given as follows:
. for every m ≥ 1.
Proof. We define the following polynomials g i,j (x):
We consider the lattice L spanned by the coefficient vectors of the polynomials g i,j (xX). These vectors form a lower triangular basis of a full rank lattice of dimension ω = βm + 1. The determinant of the lattice is then the product of diagonal elements, which gives
Because the size of the lattice L is ω = βm + 1, we can find a short coefficient vector if X satisfies the following inequality:
By direct computation, we reach the desired result.
We apply the above bound directly to the shortpad attack and let β = δ in the bound X for the original lattice to obtain
Theorem 10 leads the following bound for the improved lattice:
5 Breaking the larger padding
Because both of bounds X conv and X impr are smaller than N 1/δ 2 −ǫ , where ǫ is a positive value, the shortpad attack cannot in principle break a padding larger than N 1/δ 2 . Here, we show that the adversary can break a larger random padding by combining the shortpad attack with other attack techniques.
The original shortpad attack combined with bruteforce search
The adversary can break a larger random padding by combining the original shortpad attack with brute-force search. If the adversary intends to break a random padding of size B, it is necessary to brute-force search the remaining upper log 2 (B/X) bits. The adversary assumes the remaining upper log 2 (B/X) bits, ξ, and solves the equation g(ξ || x) = 0 for x. Obviously, this equation cannot be solved when ξ is not a correct value. Therefore, the adversary changes the value ξ until the equation is solved correctly. An adversary can test whether ξ is correct by checking the structure of the decrypted ciphertext. However,
For example, this is true for the case where
] for every ξ = 0. Therefore, this strategy cannot be applied to the shortpad attack using our improved lattice. This is also the case for formats with a challenge. Alternatively, a method that searches all of ξ for g(x) = g(ξ · x) can be considered. In this case, becauseĝ(x) ∈ Z[x δ ] for every ξ, the improved lattice can be used; however, this approach can only be used if r 1 − r 2 is a multiple of small numbers, but does not work in general, given that r 1 − r 2 has a large prime factor in most cases. We note that a smooth number for which all prime factors are small is rare, as many numbers has some large prime factors.
Stochastic techniques
Here, we consider the probability of a successful shortpad attack. As shown in the previous section, a brute-force search cannot be successfully combined with the shortpad attack on our improved lattice. However, when many ciphertexts are available, the birthday paradox works, and we can expand the insecure bound X in a stochastic sense. By combining the original shortpad attack with brute-force search, an adversary can identify the correct ξ with high probability. Because the difference between two uniform random variables associated with paddings concentrates around zero, it is more efficient to apply brute-force search in ascending order of ξ.
Brute-force search in ascending order
As noted in Proposition 11, the distribution of x = r 2 − r 1 is a unimodal distribution with the highest probability P(x = 0) = 1/B, where the probability of an event A is denoted by P(A). Hereafter, this notation will be used.
Proposition 11. Let x = r 2 − r 1 with each r 1 and r 2 distributed uniformly on [0, B − 1] ∩ Z. The probability distribution of x is then represented by
where
Proof. By direct computation, we reach the assertion.
In the last equality, we used the equality: ♯{ℓ ∈ [0, (B−1)] | k+ℓ ∈ [0, (B−1)]} = B − |k|, where we denoted the cardinality of a set A by ♯A.
Proposition 11 claims that in order to raise the probability of a successful shortpad attack using a brute-force search of the upper bits ξ of x(≥ 0), it is best to search ξ in ascending order. The adversary cannot know the sign of x in advance, but he can find the roots of both g(x) and g(−x) and choose the one that corresponds to the correct format. To consider the two cases together, we calculate the distribution of the upper bits of |x| and divide |x| = |r 2 − r 1 | into two parts: ρ = |r 2 − r 1 | mod X and ξ = (|x| − ρ)/X.
, otherwise.
Proof. We first note that
For the case of k = 0, we have
Using Theorem 12, we can verify that the cumulative distribution is given by
Equation (7) represents a concave parabola taking the maximum at k =
In particular, k ≈ 0.293 B X for p r = 1/2.
Using the Birthday Paradox for Random Paddings
Here, we consider a case where an adversary can obtain ciphertexts generated by many random paddings within the same message. In the RFID tag, if there is no limit on the number of encryptions, it is possible to obtain many different ciphertexts by randomly padding the same UID via repeated encryption. We assume that the adversary can obtain η ciphertexts as follows:
where r i (i = 1, 2, . . . , η) are independent and identically random variables uniformly distributed on [0, (B − 1)] ∩ Z for some bound B = 2 |B| (namely, the bit length of random padding is |B|) , and M is a fixed message of length n − |B|. The goal of the adversary is to extract message M . The shortpad attack requires only two ciphertexts, C 1 andC 2 .
On the other hand, it is possible to extend the range B that can be stochastically attackable, when η(≥ 2) ciphertexts available. That is, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 13. The adversary succeeds in retrieving the message M using η ciphertexts with probability p r (0 < p r < 1). Here, η satisfies
where X is the previously defined bound. η can be approximately represented as follows;
Proof. We consider η(η − 1)/2 variables x ij = r i − r j (i < j). If the condition |x ij | N ≤ X is satisfied for at least one x ij , then the shortpad attack succeeds. Such probability p r is given by
According to Proposition 11, the distribution of x ij obeys
Moreover, the approximation formula is derived from P(|x ij | > X) ≈ e −2X/B
and
Theorem 13 implies that the number of ciphertexts required for attack is approximately η ∝ B/X and describes a birthday paradox for random paddings. Because the number of times that lattice reduction is executed is η(η − 1)/2, it is asymptotically represented by
For example, consider the case X ≈ 2 246 for Rabin cryptosystem of 1,024 bits with |B| = 256 bits of random padding. The adversary succeeds at retrieving M with probability 0.5 using η ≈ 2 256 log 2/2 246 = 2 5 √ log 2 ≈ 27 ciphertexts and calling a lattice reduction routine 
Optimization of shortpad attacks
The preceding sections describe generalized approaches for an arbitrary δ. Here, we concentrate on the case where δ = 2, given that this appears to be the most important situation and we can also step up to a case for an arbitrary δ with a little modification. We note that other situations should be indeed considered; for example, δ = 4 is used besides δ = 2 in Doss et al. [8] or Zhou [30] . However, an adversary can make a breakthrough by attacking the case where δ = 2 to break the whole system.
Empirical processing time formula
In this section, we derive a formula representing the processing time in terms of the bit length n of N and lattice dimension ω. Hereafter, we assume that the lattice is full rank(i.e., ℓ = ω). We assume that U is proportional to the power of N (i.e., U = KN µ+λω for constants K, λ > 0 and µ ∈ R). This is because the entries of the basis vectors that generate the lattice used in the shortpad attack comprise the product of the powers of X ≈ N 1 δ 2 −ǫ and N . The algorithmic complexity of L 2 is O(ω 5 (ω + log U ) log U ), where U is the largest Euclidean norm of u i (i = 1, 2, . . . , ω). L 2 is the most efficient algorithm for finding short vectors with a norm less than that of the LLL bound in lattices with large entries. The processing time for the L 2 algorithm is represented by the following form:
It is impractical to attempt to discern the exact relationship between the coefficients γ i (n) and n, because it would require an enormous amount of processing time. However, in practice, it is sufficient to have estimation formulae for typical n = 1, 024, 1, 536, and 2, 048. Here, we performed a computer simulation to measure the processing time for a fixed N with 100 random paddings in order to compute average values. All programs were run on a computer with a macOS High Sierra 10.13.5 and a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 proessor and 8 GB 1333 MHz DDR3 RAM. The results of coefficient computations for these average values are shown in Table 2 and represent estimated results for the same N , although nearly the same results were obtained for different values of N . The fitted curves of the estimated processing times for the improved lattice with δ = 2 and the estimated curves are shown in Figure 1 . According to Table 2 , R 2 -values range (11) is a good approximation of the measured processing time. It turns out that the coefficient associated with the conventional lattice was smaller. This might be because numerous zeros are included in the component of the coefficient vectors; however, for the same m, the processing time associated with the conventional lattice takes almost twice as much as that for the improved lattice.
The most efficient shortpad attacks
In this section, we describe the principle for determining the dimension of the target lattice that enables the most efficient shortpad attacks. The bound
δ 2 m )⌋ that can be attacked at one time expands as m increases. As shown in Section 6.1, the processing time, τ n (ω), for lattice reduction is represented as (11) , and the bound X per unit time is given by X/τ n (ω). The adversary requires m, which maximizes the function E(m) = log 2 (X/τ n (ω)). E(m) represents the efficiency of the shortpad attack on a logarithmic scale. These are represented explicitly by:
The former and the latter correspond to the conventional and improved lattices, respectively. Because these efficiencies are non-negative concave functions, such that E conv (m) < E impr (m) for at least the N being addressed, we show these in Figure 6 .2 for δ = 2 and n = log 2 (3 · 2 1022 ) as the average bit size of N . For example, the efficiency E impr (m) takes the maximum 246.98 when m = 17(ω = 35), and E conv (m) takes the maximum 243.94 when m = 28(ω = 113) ( Table 3) .
For the original shortpad attack on a padding of size B, the total attack time, T (m), can be represented as the product (B/X) · τ n (γ) of the number of calls of the lattice-reduction routine, B/X, and the processing time associated with lattice reduction, τ n (m). The logarithm of the total attack time is given 
Therefore, minimizing the total attack time is equivalent to maximizing E conv/impr (m).
7 Determining the optimal size of random padding
In this section, we describe the relationship between padding size and the processing time required for the two types of shortpad attacks (i.e., the combination of the original shortpad attack and brute-force search and the one of our improved shortpad attack and the birthday paradox) in order to determine a safe padding size. Although this represents a size determined using our computational environment, it is possible to determine an optimal padding size according to a required specification based on this result.
Attack strategies
As shown, the shortpad attack using a low-dimensional lattice is efficient, but unable to be combined with brute-force search; therefore, if B > X, a stochastic approach is required. Here, the attack strategies used by the adversary are as follows.
[ We solved this problem finding minimum computation time for attack according to [Strategy 1], as described in Section 6, with the total attack time is given by
where m conv min is the minimizer for the conventional lattice, B/X conv (m conv min ) represents the number of times that lattice reduction is executed, and the processing time of lattice reduction is τ n (δ 2 m conv min + 1). If the adversary is able to obtain multiple ciphertexts, it is possible to further expand the size of attackable random padding.
In attacks using [Strategy 2], it is necessary to consider the time required to compute a large number of ciphertexts according to a crypto-device, such as an RFID tag. The total attack time associated with [Strategy 2] is equal to the minimum of the sum of the processing time necessary for all lattice reduction routines. If the time required for the RFID tag to return the ciphertext is represented by T tag , the total processing time, T total (m), is given as follows:
The adversary chooses m to minimize T total (m). The first term of the left-hand side of equation (13) is dependent upon the processing speed of the computer used to execute lattice reduction, and the second term is dependent upon the encryption speed of the crypto-device. Because generally B > X, the first term is much larger than the second term. According to Arbit et al. [1] , 180ms was required for one encryption process using their high-performance Rabin encryption hardware. For example, considering an expansion of B by about 40 bits, and assuming that the processing time, including the time required for input/output etc. is T tag = 200 ms, 2 20 ciphertexts could be generated in about 2.5 days, thereby representing a negligible time cost. Therefore, the minimizer associated with equation (13) is equivalent to m min (i.e., the minimizer of the first term). Therefore,
In particular, T total (m) ≈
0.15B
Ximpr(m) · τ n (δm + 1) for p r = 1/2.
Determination of a safe padding size
In this subsection, we determine a safe random-padding size based on the processing-time formula given by equation (12) . In an actual shortpad attack, it is necessary to find the roots of the polynomial with coefficients obtained by lattice reduction; however, the computation time required for this process is sufficiently small and negligible relative to that required for lattice reduction. Here, if the optimal value of m is denoted by m * and padding size |B|, the processing time necessary for an attack is given by 2 |B|−E(m * ) . For example, to obtain a padding size that takes 1,000 years with probability 1/2 for an attack, because 1,000 years equals 2 34.88 sec, a safe padding size can be denoted by |B| = allocates ξ to each machine so that overlap is avoided, resulting K-fold increases in speed relative to that using a single computer. For [Strategy 2], we denote the probability of successfully finding a padding pair with a difference smaller than X by p s on a single computer; therefore, the probability of finding a pair on at least one of all machines used will be approximately 1 − (1 − p s ) K ≈ Kp s , resulting in a K-fold increase in speed for [Strategy 2] relative to using a single computer. There are few studies focusing on the data formats from the standpoint of cryptography. The most time-consuming process for Rabin encryption is division by N , because it is a RAM-intensive process. There are two ways to avoid this calculation. One is by using Montgomery reduction [19] , and the other is by using the WIPR scheme. The WIPR scheme which was developed by Naccache [20] and Shamir [25] , [26] simplifies the process by adding a random number, R WIPR , to the squared value and not performing modular arithmetic. The WIPR scheme replaces R WIPR with the output of a light-stream cipher, which was developed by Oren-Feldhofer [22] . On the other hand, the Montgomery method, does not find the remainder according to N , but rather finds the remainder according to the power of 2. Generally, finding the remainder according to the power of 2 can only be performed by eliminating the upper bits, which simplifies the process and increases the processing speed.
The WIPR scheme
The WIPR challenge-response protocol is as follows:
1. Challenge: the interrogator sends the challenge(a random bit string), c, of length s to the tag.
2. Response: the RFID tag generates two random bit strings, R tag and R WIPR , where |R tag | = n − s − |UID| and |R WIPR | = n + t. The tag generates the following message: M = BYTEMIX(c||R tag ||UID), and transmits the following ciphertext:
where BYTEMIX represents a simple byte-interleaving operation [23] .
3. Verification: the interrogator decrypts C ′ to find the correct message.
Here, s and t are security parameters (originally set to s = t = 80).
In the reduced version of WIPR described by Wu-Stinson [29] , BYTEMIX is an identity map. Generally, WIPR is vulnerable when BYTEMIX converts to a format projective equivalent to the original format (c||R tag ||UID) and |R tag | is small. According to our results (Table 4 ), a cryptographic designer should set |R tag | to a value ≥ 281(= ⌈280.59⌉) bits. Wu-Stinson [29] recommends |R tag | ≈ 512, which is also safe; however, this padding size is unnecessarily large.
RAMON
RAMON was proposed by Giesecke & Devrient GmbH [13] . In this method, the RFID tag sends the following ciphertext:
where Mont(M ) = M ·2 n mod N , 2 n is required for Montgomery reduction [19] , and the interrogator multiplies 2 −n mod N at the time of decoding in order to extract M . For an N of 1,024 bits, the message M is formatted as follows: M (1,024 bits) = [challenge(80 bits) || R tag (80 bits) || UID || variable length filling || checksum(16 bit)]. The last byte must be left free(i.e., it is set to zero (8 bits)).
RAMON is vulnerable, because its format is projective equivalent to the format (UID || variable length filling || checksum || challenge || R tag ), and the random padding size of 80 bits is much smaller than 256(= 1, 024/2 2 ). Because the shortpad attack using the conventional lattice works in the case of RAMON with a padding of this size, the UID can be extracted within a short period.
Conclusion
In this study, we described a method for determining the optimal size of random padding for Rabin cryptosystem. For that, we developed a new measurement for the Rabin cryptosystem, i.e., we improved the Coppersmith's shortpad attack. By using this measurement, we determined the optimal security parameter, m, that addresses trade-offs between security and efficiency.
